Vaalimenestys ja hallituksen muodostaminen Länsi-Euroopassa 1945-1999

Authors

• Mikko Mattila

Abstract

Government formation is guided by principles such as majority, plurality and electoral gain. According to the principle of electoral gain parties that increase their share of seats in elections should form the government, with parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse the fulfilment of this principle in fi fteen West European countries with multiparty coalition governments between 1945 and 1999. With the exception of the largest party, electoral performance is a rather poor predictor of a party’s chances of getting into the government. The results show interesting variation between the countries, with the loss of seats increasing the probability of entering the government in Austria, Germany, Spain and Italy. High electoral volatility is positively related to the fulfilment of the electoral gain principle, but there was no association between party system fragmentation or aggregation and the fulfilment of the principle. Prime ministers are more likely to come from parties that are big winners, but winning does not explain the probability of becoming a coalition partner. If a party wants to be a coalition partner it is more important to avoid losing seats than to be an actual winner.