Politiikka ja hallinto ydinvoimapoliittisen kriisin aikana:
Radioaktiivinen laskeuma Länsi-Saksassa Tshernobylin onnettomuuden jälkeen
Abstract
How do public bureaucracies cope with hazards if they lack lawful provisions, specific experiences or governmental directions? Governments and adminstrations in West Germany were taken completely surprise by the nuclear fallout after the “Chernobyl” reactor-blaze in 1986. The author describes and attempts to explain their reactions here. Efforts of the West German federal government to coordinate and centralize decision-making were confronted with attempts by state and lower adminstrations to preserve their legal authorities. Additionally, many local and regional authorities had been confronted with citizen protests and attempts of self-regulation organized by radiological experts. Thus, an adminstrative crisis emerged which eclipsed the problems of nuclear contamination. During “Chernobyl” national governments tried to restrict autonomous local initiatives. They feared increasing conflicts on the energy-environment issue in their countries. The question arises as to whether decentralized, politically interlocked, or centralized structures of disaster management would be preferable, in order to react to such threats in an adequate manner. This article provides an empirical base for the discussion of this questionNedladdningar
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Referera så här
Czada, R. (1990). Politiikka ja hallinto ydinvoimapoliittisen kriisin aikana:: Radioaktiivinen laskeuma Länsi-Saksassa Tshernobylin onnettomuuden jälkeen. Politiikka, 32(1), 5–19. Hämtad från https://journal.fi/politiikka/article/view/150838
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