Oikeusnormit ja kollektiivinen turvallisuus
Abstract
Collective security has not enjoyed much success among theorists of the post-war order. The recent activation of the United Nations has, however, prompted many observers to speak of a return to the ’original’ security concept of the Charter. On the other hand, others have claimed that the UN’s reaction has seemed more reflective of the play of great-power interests than a genuine rebirth of collective security. The article argues that the traditional contrast between balance of power and collective security misconceives the character of decision-making in matters of international security. The causal- empirical bias of international theory fails to account for the inevitable role legal norms and procedures play in constituting what counts as ’security’ in the first place and in the debates over the justification of collective action in particular situations. George Ken- nan’s characterization of international law as a ’gentle civilizer of the pursuit of national self-interest’ throws a welcome focus on the role of law as a culture of openness and accountability, much needed in the Security Council’s daily activity.Nedladdningar
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Referera så här
Koskenniemi, M. (1995). Oikeusnormit ja kollektiivinen turvallisuus. Politiikka, 37(3), 163–180. Hämtad från https://journal.fi/politiikka/article/view/151112
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