The development of Finnish anti-tank weapons, 1918-1939

doctrine, procurement and national industrial policy

Authors

• Michael Halila

DOI: https://doi.org/10.33355/tw.84897

Keywords:

military technology, anti-tank warfare, Finland, military approprations, doctrine, industrial policy

Abstract

This article deals with the Finnish army's failure to acquire anti-tank weapons in the interwar period. Even though Finland was an early adopter of armor, anti-tank weapons became neglected when a clique of German-trained officers took control of the Finnish army in 1924. Disregarding practical evidence, they believed that Finnish terrain was impassable to armor, and therefore anti-tank defenses were unnecessary. Their beliefs were rooted in a nationalist conception of Finnist terrain as totally different from Central Europe, and were only challenged in the 1930's when formally trained officers started rising through the ranks. Once they questioned the prevailing orthodoxy and practical experiments were performed, it became clear that Finnish terrain was not so unique after all.

Even after the need for anti-tank weapons was understood, the chaotic state of the Finnish armed forces delayed procurement. There was no formal procurement process, and weapon system evaluations were carried out by small, over-worked committees. When the decision was made to procure 37mm anti-tank guns from Bofors, national industrial policy intervened, and instead of buying guns from Sweden, complex schemes to create joint Finnish-Swedish armament production were developed. When these came to naught, it was decided to create a state-owned munitions plant, effectively from scratch. After a 1935 decision to procure the guns, the first pieces were delivered in October 1939; barely over a month before the Soviet invasion.