Rationaalisen toiminnan teoria ja kansainvälinen ilmastonsuojelu

Authors

• Petteri Hiienkoski

Abstract

This article continues a game theoretical discussion. Rational choice models are here applied to international cooperation concerning climate protection. Empirical evidence shows that the classical And International hypothesis of subjects being rational and egoistic is problematic - not only because of the paradox of individual and collective rationality, but also because of the conflict between short-term and long- term rationality. Theoretical problems appear in the anarchical international system. Differences between short- and long-term results increase the generation gap. Future generations face the costs while present generations enjoy the benefits. Rationality concepts seem to be hierarchical. It takes time to learn the need for broader rationality. This constitutes a rational lag. In the case of climate protection, the lags may be catastrophic. It is useful to adapt the time dimension and new concepts of rationality to the rational choice models.