Hegemoninen valta neuvottelumenestyksen kompastinkivenä:

Yhdysvallat Indonesiassa, 1947-1990

Authors

• Timo Kivimäki

Abstract

Negotiations between the United States and Indonesia after the Second World War are cases of sucessful bargaining on behalf of a developing country. These negotiations can be analysed in the light of some new perspectives offered by the model of asymmetrical bargaining, which explains the sources of Indonesia’s bargaining success with the United States. The empirical findings show a relationship between international power and bargaining leverage in international negotiations. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it appears that power does not necessarily imply strength in negotiations and that the lack of power can sometimes be used as an asset in negotiations. The model of asymmetrical bargaining which explains the bargaining strength of weak nations is a synthesis of game-theoretic bargaining models, neo-Realist and neo-Gramscian models of hegemonic phases and decision-theoretic models of institutional bargaining.