Författningsändring och problemlösning: en studie av kvalificerade majoriteter i 34 stater

Authors

• Dag Anckar

Abstract

The constitutions of the countries of the world are as a rule rigid rather than flexible. However, countries differ in terms of the extent of rigidity. Whereas some require two-thirds parliamentary majorities or even less for constitutional amendment, others require three-fourths majorities. This essay aims at explaining this difference. The point of departure is the observation by Arend Lijphart that large parliamentary majorities in plural systems often represent much smaller popular majorities and even single-party majorities, and that supermajorities in plurality systems are therefore less constraining than the same supermajorities in proportional systems. While maintaining a conception of institutions as problem-solvers the essay investigates the hypothesis that the choice of countries of supermajority thresholds may largely be explained by reference to principles of rational action. This appears indeed to be the case. An examination of amendment rigidity in 34 democracies with plural systems suggests that countries that have experienced at the dawn of independence a dominant party system or an extreme ethnic heterogeneity have as a rule opted for the three-fourths threshold and, in consequence, for a powerful constraint. Of other countries, all but one (Mauritius) has settled for two-thirds majorities.