Sodan teoria ja Venäjän sota Ukrainassa 2013–2022
Keywords:
Ukraina, Venäjä, Carl von Clausewitz, sota, strategiaAbstract
Why is it easier to recognize the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 as a war than, for instance, the fighting in Donbas that started in the beginning of 2014? The simplest answer to the question is found in our way of understanding war, which still largely follows Carl von Clausewitz’ theory of war as large-scale interstate violence to disarm the enemy. Prior to Russia’s large-scale invasion the War in Donbas was deemed too limited, and due to politics ambiguous. As a consequence, the Western countries remained largely passive, while theory saw repeated attempts to discover prefixes to war to distinguish it from “traditional” war described by Clausewitz. Clausewitz’ unfinished theory is nevertheless contradictory: different readings of it can view war to constitute either violence or politics, where war constitutes a much broader phenomenon than mere combat. Equally, Clausewitz presented the modern concept of strategy, which focuses on the relationship between ends, means and ways. Clausewitz's theory sees war as a political instrument and consists of a coherent analysis of concepts and principles of war. It thus offers an analytical structure through which wars can be analyzed, and ultimately fought. These various concepts are used in a chronological analysis of the situation in Ukraine, which focuses on the years 2013-2022.
